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INTRODUCTION 
In its recent 8–1 decision in Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.,1 
the Supreme Court both clarified and confused the law governing induced 
patent infringement.  Up until the Supreme Court’s decision, the law of 
inducement, namely the level of intent required in order for one to be found 
liable for inducement, was in a confused state.  Because of seemingly 
conflicting case law within the Federal Circuit, patent holders and innovators 
were left with uncertainties over when liability for induced infringement 
could attach: Must an innovator knowingly induce only the acts that happen to 
cause infringement?  Or must he induce acts knowing that those acts will 
cause infringement? 
While the Court clarified the issue of intent once and for all, in doing so, it 
injected another element of confusion into the mix, holding that “willful 
blindness” could satisfy the knowledge requirement for induced patent 
infringement.2  Although the Court announced a seemingly clear test for what 
qualifies as willful blindness, this Comment will illustrate that the Court’s 
new formulation of induced patent infringement, particularly the willful 
blindness aspect, is not so clear-cut.  Different interpretations of the rule will 
bring different consequences and policy considerations. 
Part I of this Comment will briefly trace the origins and history of the law 
of induced patent infringement and discuss the debate within the Federal 
Circuit leading up to the Supreme Court’s decision in Global-Tech.  Part II 
will summarize the Court’s decision, paying particular attention to its 
treatment of the knowledge requirement for induced patent infringement and 
 
1.  Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011). 
2.  Id. at 2069. 
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the new willful blindness standard.  Part III will discuss the problems with the 
willful blindness standard and will elaborate two potential interpretations of 
the rule, and potential problems with each.  Finally, Part IV concludes that the 
less stringent standard should be followed, but only when omissions are made 
in bad faith. 
I.  INDUCED PATENT INFRINGEMENT 
Patent infringement occurs when one “without authority makes, uses, 
offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or 
imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the 
patent.”3  As Professor Mark Lemley notes, “patent courts have long 
recognized that focusing only on the party who actually practices the 
invention will sometimes let off the hook the party who deserves to be held 
liable.”4  For that reason, liability for patent infringement has long been 
extended to include not only those who directly infringe, but also to those 
who contribute to infringement and to those who induce infringement.5  The 
goal is to give patent owners “effective protection in circumstances in which 
the actual infringer either is not the truly responsible party or is impractical to 
sue.”6 
Before 1952, courts recognized “secondary patent infringement,” which 
could be comprised of either what is now known as induced infringement, or 
what is now known as contributory infringement.7  In 1952, the Patent Act 
was amended and Congress clearly separated the offense of active inducement 
from that of contributory infringement.8  While the two offenses are similar in 
that they punish third parties rather than direct infringers, they are distinctly 
different.  “The distinction between contributory and induced infringement is 
summarized by noting that while contributory infringement involves the sale 
of components or parts to the direct infringer, induced infringement covers 
‘other acts’ that direct, facilitate, or abet infringement.”9 
Both of the statutory sections for contributory infringement and induced 
infringement contain an ambiguity as to the level of knowledge and intent 
 
3.  35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). 
4.  Mark A. Lemley, Inducing Patent Infringement, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 225, 226 (2005). 
5.  See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)–(c). 
6.  Lemley, supra note 4, at 228. 
7.  Id. at 227; see also Thomas-Houston Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 80 F. 712 (6th Cir. 
1897). 
8.  See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)–(c). 
9.  David W. Roadcap, Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A. and the Creation of a 
Flexible Blindness Standard for Induced Patent Infringement, 13 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 117, 121–22 
(2011) (citing Lemley, supra note 4, at 227). 
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required in order for one to be held liable for infringement.10  Governing 
contributory infringement, section 271(c) states: 
Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States . . . a 
component of a patented [invention] . . . constituting a material part of 
the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially 
adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple 
article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial 
noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.11 
Similarly, governing induced infringement, section 271(b) states 
“[w]hoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an 
infringer.”12  Both of these sections contain an ambiguity; to be liable for 
contributory infringement, must one “need[ ] to intend to commit the acts that 
constitute contributory infringement or . . . [must] the party also need[ ] to 
intend that the third party infringe”?13  To be liable for induced infringement, 
must one knowingly induce acts that happen to cause infringement, or must he 
induce acts knowing that they will cause infringement? 
As for contributory infringement, that ambiguity was resolved by the 
Supreme Court in the case of Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top 
Replacement Co. (Aro II).14  Here, the Court noted that Congress, by enacting 
section 271(c), wished to codify existing case law, which premised liability on 
“mak[ing] and sell[ing] one element of a combination covered by a patent 
with the intention and for the purpose of bringing about its use in such a 
combination.”15  Thus, the Court in Aro II reiterated that intent to contribute 
to infringement was required. 
The ambiguity as to induced infringement was not resolved so easily; 
while it was settled that intent was required to be liable for induced 
infringement,16 until recently, there has been disagreement over precisely 
what intent is necessary.  Two Federal Circuit cases, decided only weeks 
apart, set forth two opposing standards, perpetuating the uncertainty in the 
 
10.  See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)–(c). 
11.  Id. § 271(c). 
12.  Id. § 271(b). 
13.  Roadcap, supra note 9, at 121 (citing Jason A. Rantanen, An Objective View of Fault in 
Patent Infringement, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1575, 1589–1609 (2011)). 
14.  377 U.S. 476 (1964). 
15.  Id. at 486–87 (quoting Thomas–Houston, 80 F. 712 at 721 (6th Cir. 1897)). 
16.  See, e.g., Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2003); 
3M Co. v. Chemque, Inc., 303 F.3d 1294, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Water Tech. Corp. v. Gartner, 850 
F.2d 660, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
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area.  In Hewlett–Packard v. Bausch & Lomb,17 the Federal Circuit held that 
one could be liable for inducement if it could be proven that he “actual[ly] 
intend[ed] to cause the acts which constitute the infringement.”18  In Manville 
Sales v. Paramount Systems, Inc.,19 however, the Federal Circuit held that in 
order to be held liable for induced infringement, the defendant must have the 
“specific intent to encourage another’s infringement and not merely . . . ha[ve] 
knowledge of the acts alleged to constitute inducement.”20  These two very 
different holdings, Hewlett-Packard setting a very low intent requirement, and 
Manville, setting a very high intent requirement, created much uncertainty for 
not only lower courts seeking to apply the standard, but for inventors and 
patent holders as well.21 
This ambiguity was finally settled by the Federal Circuit in DSU Medical 
Corp. v. JMS Co., Ltd.22  There, the court held that “‘knowledge of the acts 
alleged to constitute infringement’ is not enough” to incur liability for induced 
patent infringement.23 
II.  THE SUPREME COURT’S “CLARIFICATION”:                                              
GLOBAL-TECH APPLIANCES V. SEB 
Although DSU seemed to clarify the issue of what level of knowledge one 
must have in order to incur liability for induced patent infringement under 
§ 271(b), the Supreme Court attempted to make it crystal clear with its 
holding in Global-Tech.24  The decision affirmed the ruling of the Federal 
Circuit in DSU, confirming that the knowledge requirement under section 
271(b) requires knowledge that the induced acts will cause patent 
infringement.25  However, the Court was also asked to specifically clarify the 
“knowledge” requirement; namely, the Court needed to determine whether 
“deliberate indifference” could qualify as knowledge under the statute.26 
 
17.  909 F.2d 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
18.  Id. at 1469. 
19.  917 F.2d 544 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
20.  Id. at 553. 
21.  Lemley, supra note 4, at 239.  As Professor Lemley points out in his 2005 article, lower 
courts applied both standards in different circuits, but the Manville approach was followed more 
frequently than the Hewlett-Packard approach. 
22.  471 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
23.  Id. at 1305 (quoting Warner-Lambert, 316 F.3d at 1363). 
24.  See Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. 2060. 
25.  For a detailed discussion of the procedural history of Global-Tech and the Court’s 
decision, see James G. Dilmore, Ph.D., Actual Knowledge of Direct Patent Infringement is Required 
for Induced Infringement: Global Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 50 DUQ. L. REV. 659, 661–62 
(2012). 
26.  Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2065. 
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SEB is a company specializing in manufacturing and selling home-
cooking appliances.27  SEB sells products in the United States through its 
subsidiary, T-Fal Corp., and owns U.S. Patent No. 4,995,312 (“The ‘312 
Patent”).28  The patent covered SEB’s “cool-touch” deep fryer, which 
implemented “external services that remain[ed] cool during the frying 
process.”29  SEB obtained the patent in 1991, and sold the fryers under the “T-
Fal” brand in the United States with great commercial success.30 
Petitioner Pentalpha Enterprises, Ltd., is a Hong Kong company 
specializing in manufacturing home appliances, and is a wholly owned 
subsidiary of Global-Tech Appliances.31  In 1997, one of SEB’s U.S. 
competitors, Sunbeam Products, Inc., asked Pentalpha to develop deep fryers 
for Sunbeam.32  Pentalpha purchased one of SEB’s fryers in Hong Kong, and 
copied all of its functional features in order to develop the type of fryer 
Sunbeam had requested.33  Importantly, because the fryer was purchased 
abroad, and was made for sale in a non-U.S. market, the product that 
Pentalpha copied did not bear U.S. patent markings.34 
After designing its fryer, Pentalpha commissioned a right-to-use study 
from an attorney in order to determine whether Pentalpha’s product was 
infringing on any other products.35  Pentalpha did not tell the attorney that it 
had directly copied SEB’s fryer in Hong Kong.36  The attorney did not locate 
the ‘312 patent’ as part of his search, and subsequently wrote an opinion letter 
indicating that Pentalpha’s deep fryer did not infringe any patents that he was 
able to locate.37  Based on that opinion letter, Pentalpha sold its deep fryers to 
Sunbeam, who began selling the fryers in the United States, which 
significantly undercut SEB’s business in the U.S. market.38 
Pentalpha continued to sell fryers to other U.S. companies for resale, 
including Fingerhut and Montgomery Ward.39  SEB sued Pentalpha asserting 
both direct infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), and induced patent 
infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), under the theory that Pentalpha 
 
27.  SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 594 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
28.  Id. 
29.  Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2063. 
30.  Id. at 2064. 
31.  Id. 
32.  Id. 
33.  Id. 
34.  Id. 
35.  Id. 
36.  Id. 
37.  Id. 
38.  Id. 
39.  Id. 
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actively induced other companies to sell or offer to sell the fryers in violation 
of SEB’s rights.40 
At trial, a jury found for SEB on both the direct infringement and 
inducement claims.41  Pentalpha appealed, arguing that there was no evidence 
to support the jury’s finding of inducement based on the fact that Pentalpha 
did not have actual knowledge of the ‘312 Patent’ at the time Pentalpha 
designed its fryer.42 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the 
judgment of the trial court.43  The Federal Circuit held that section 271(b) 
requires a “plaintiff [to] show that the alleged infringer knew or should have 
known that his actions would induce actual infringements.”44  The Federal 
Circuit used circumstantial evidence to find that Pentalpha knew about the 
‘312 Patent, and found Pentalpha liable for induced patent infringement based 
on its deliberate indifference, stating “Pentalpha deliberately disregarded a 
known risk that SEB had a protective patent.”45  According to the Federal 
Circuit, “deliberate indifference” is a form of actual knowledge, and held that 
a showing of deliberate indifference was enough to satisfy the requirements of 
section 271(b).46 
Pentalpha petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, asserting that 
liability for active inducement under section 271(b) requires a higher standard 
than “deliberate indifference to a known risk that . . . induced acts may violate 
an existing patent.”47  The Supreme Court granted Pentalpha’s petition.48 
Before dealing with the issue of whether the Federal Circuit’s “deliberate 
indifference” standard was proper, the Court first spent time clarifying the 
often confusing standard of what level of intent is necessary to be liable for 
induced infringement; must one only intend to induce certain acts, or must 
one induce acts with the specific intent to cause infringement?49  The Court 
concluded, based on an analysis of the text of section 271, its legislative 
history, and Supreme Court precedent, that the correct interpretation of 
section 271(b) requires “knowledge that the induced acts constitute patent 
 
40.  Id. 
41.  Id. 
42.  Id. 
43.  SEB S.A., 594 F.3d at 1381. 
44.  Id. at 1376 (citing DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., Ltd., 471 F.3d 1293, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 
2006)). 
45.  Id. at 1377. 
46.  Id. at 1377–78. 
47.  Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2065. 
48.  Id. 
49.  Id. at 2067–68. 
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infringement.”50 
Next, the Court turned to the principal issue in the case—whether the 
Federal Circuit’s holding that “deliberate indifference” constitutes knowledge 
for purposes of induced patent infringement is proper.  While the Court 
ultimately affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals—that Pentalpha 
was liable for induced patent infringement—the Court rejected the Federal 
Circuit’s deliberate indifference standard, holding, instead, that the statute 
requires “willful blindness.”51 
In rejecting the Federal Circuit’s standard of deliberate indifference and 
instead holding that willful blindness can satisfy the knowledge requirement 
of section 271(b), the Court stated that the test applied by the Federal Circuit 
“permits a finding of knowledge when there is merely a ‘known risk’ that the 
induced acts are infringing . . . [and] demanding only ‘deliberate indifference’ 
to that risk, the Federal Circuit’s test does not require active efforts by an 
inducer to avoid knowing about the infringing nature of the activities.”52  
Thus, the Court exhibited a desire to heighten the knowledge requirement, and 
indeed wished to announce a standard that “surpasses recklessness and 
negligence.”53 
The Court’s solution was to hold that a “willful blindness” standard was 
appropriate to satisfy the knowledge requirements of section 271(b).54  The 
Court traced the history of the willful blindness doctrine, noting that it is well 
established in criminal law, and, by and large, accepted by every Circuit Court 
of Appeals.55  For those reasons, the Court could find “no reason why the 
doctrine should not apply in civil lawsuits for induced patent infringement 
 
50.  Id. at 2068. The Court reasoned that its holding in Aro Manufacturing Company v. 
Convertible Top Replacement Company, 377 U.S. 476 (1964) (Aro II) answered the issue.  Aro II 
concerned the interpretation of section 271(c), which like 271(b), is ambiguous as to what level of 
intent is required for liability to attach.  The Court pointed out that “the holding in Aro II has become 
a fixture in the law of contributory infringement,” Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2068 (citing R. MOY, 
WALKER ON PATENTS § 15:20, 15–131 (4th ed. 2009), and Congress has not seen fit to amend the 
law.  Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2068.  Aro II held that section 271(c), the statute governing 
contributory infringement, required knowledge of the existence of the patent that is infringed. Id.  
The Court in Global-Tech reasoned that, since sections 271(b) and (c) were enacted at the same time 
and share a common origin in pre–1952 case law, the same knowledge should be required for section 
271(b). Id.  The Court stated “[i]t would thus be strange to hold that knowledge of the relevant patent 
is needed under [section] 271(c) but not under [section] 271(b).” Id.  For an in-depth discussion of 
the Court’s reasoning on this point, see Dilmore, supra note 25, at 662–65. 
51.  Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2068. 
52.  Id. at 2071. 
53.  Id. at 2070. 
54.  Id. at 2069. 
55.  Id.  The Court noted that the only Court of Appeals that has not “fully embraced the 
doctrine” is the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.  Id. 
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under [section] 271(b).”56  Accordingly, the Court articulated the new 
standard for knowledge under section 271(b): a defendant is willfully blind 
for the purposes of induced patent infringement if he 1) subjectively believes 
that there is a high probability that a patent exists; and 2) takes deliberate 
actions to avoid learning of that fact.57 
Applying its new standard for induced infringement, the Court held 
Pentalpha liable, finding that there was evidence for a jury to conclude that 
Pentalpha subjectively believed in a high probability that SEB’s patent 
existed, and that Pentalpha took deliberate actions to avoid learning that 
fact.58  The Court pointed to evidence that SEB’s fryer was an innovation in 
the market, Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2071, and had gained substantial 
commercial success.59  Pentalpha’s CEO testified that Pentalpha routinely 
“performed ‘market research’ and gathered information as much as possible” 
when developing new products; therefore, the Court concluded that Pentalpha 
must have known about the success of SEB’s fryer.60  Furthermore, the Court 
noted that “Pentalpha’s belief that SEB’s fryer embodied advanced 
technology that would be valuable in the U.S. market [was] evidenced by its 
decision to copy all but the cosmetic features of [the fryer].”61 
As further evidence to support a finding of willful blindness, the Court 
pointed to Pentalpha’s decision to copy an overseas model of SEB’s cool-
touch fryer—one that Pentalpha knew would not bear U.S. patent markings 
because it was made for sales overseas.62  After copying the overseas model, 
Pentalpha’s CEO, John Sham, failed to inform the attorney commissioned to 
write a right-to-use opinion that John Sham had copied the overseas version.63  
The Court “[could not] fathom what motive Sham could have had for 
withholding [such] information other than to manufacture a claim of plausible 
deniability in the event that his company was later accused of patent 
infringement.”64 
The Court determined that the evidence was more than enough for a jury 
 
56.  Id. At least one commentator notes that the Court’s application of a criminal law standard 
in this context is misplaced, and it may have negative implications for the criminal bar, and erodes 
the credibility of the Federal Circuit.  See Dilmore, supra note 25, at 675–81. 
57.  Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2070. 
58.  Id. at 2072. 
59.  Id. at 2064. 
60.  Id. at 2071. 
61.  Id. 
62.  Id. The Court pointed out that Pentalpha’s CEO was a named inventor on many U.S. 
patents, and “was well aware that products made for overseas markets usually do not bear U.S. patent 
markings.” Id. (citing Brief for Appellant, 594 F. 3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (No. 2009–1099)). 
63.  Id. 
64.  Id. 
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to find that Pentalpha both subjectively believed that SEB’s patent existed, 
and that Pentalpha took deliberate steps to avoid learning about the patent.65  
Therefore, the Court affirmed the Federal Circuit’s holding.66 
III. HOW TO APPLY THE STANDARD: PROS AND CONS 
As the Court noted in Global-Tech, the standard for willful blindness, for 
purposes of induced patent infringement, is that a defendant must have a 
subjective belief in a high probability that a patent exists, and “must take 
deliberate actions to avoid learning that fact.”67  While the test seems clear on 
its face, the manner in which the Court applied the test to the case at bar left 
some unanswered questions for lower courts regarding how the test should be 
applied. 
In establishing that willful blindness could constitute knowledge for 
induced infringement, the Court clearly expressed its desire to apply a 
standard that surpassed mere recklessness or negligence, and one that requires 
active efforts by an inducer to avoid learning that a patent exists.68  The Court 
distinguished among these various states of mind by citing to the 1962 draft of 
the Model Penal Code, which has since become official.  The Code defines a 
reckless defendant as one who “consciously disregards a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that [a] material element exists or will result from his 
conduct.”69  Similarly, a negligent defendant is one who “should be aware of a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that [a] material element exists or will result 
from his conduct.”70  A willfully blind defendant, on the other hand, “is one 
who takes deliberate actions to avoid confirming a high probability of 
wrongdoing and who can almost be said to have actually known the critical 
facts.”71  As some commentators note, “all wilfully [sic] ignorant defendants 
are reckless, but . . . not all reckless defendants are wilfully [sic] ignorant.”72  
Thus, the Court’s rule seems to imply that a defendant cannot be found to 
have been willfully blind unless he takes some sort of “active efforts” to avoid 
 
65.  Id. 
66.  Id. at 2072. 
67.  Id. at 2070. 
68.  Id. at 2070–71. 
69.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(c) (1962). 
70.  Id. § 2.02(d). 
71.  Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2070–71 (citing GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF 
CRIMINAL LAW § 57, at 159 (2d ed. 1983) (stating “A court can properly find willful blindness only 
where it can almost be said that the defendant actually knew”). 
72.  Douglas N. Husak & Craig A. Callender, Willful Ignorance, Knowledge, and the “Equal 
Culpability” Thesis: A Study of the Deeper Significance of the Principle of Legality, 1994 WIS. L. 
REV. 29, 42 (1994). 
HAGEN FORMATTED FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/24/2013  12:45 PM 
314 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. [Vol. 17:2 
 
learning about the existence of a patent.73 
While the Court seemed to clearly articulate that active efforts to avoid 
learning about a patent is required before a finding of willful blindness can be 
made, its analysis of prior federal case law applying the willful blindness 
doctrine, as well as its analysis of Pentalpha’s behavior, seem to indicate that 
passive behavior can also result in a finding of willful blindness.74  First, to 
justify its importation of the willful blindness doctrine into patent law, the 
Court referred to several Federal cases that applied the doctrine.75  While the 
Court seemed to take pains to indicate that active efforts are required for 
willful blindness, most of the cases to which the Court cited allowed a finding 
of willful blindness upon a showing that the Defendant “closed his eyes” to a 
certain fact.  For example, the Court cited to the Fourth Circuit case United 
States v. Schnabel,76 which stated “[t]he willful blindness instruction allows 
the jury to impute the element of knowledge to the defendant if the evidence 
indicates that he purposely closed his eyes to avoid knowing what was taking 
place around him.”77  The Court also cited a Sixth Circuit case, United States 
v. Holloway,78 which upheld a jury instruction allowing the jury to impute 
knowledge if the defendant “merely . . . deliberately clos[ed] his eyes to the 
obvious risk that he [was] engaging in unlawful conduct.”79  The Court cited 
to numerous other similarly held cases to support its justification for the 
willful blindness standard.80 
In addition to justifying the willful blindness standard with reference to 
cases that seem to allow a finding of willful blindness based on a defendants 
passive behavior, the Court seemed to indicate that passive behavior might be 
enough for a finding of willful blindness in its analysis of the facts of the case 
at bar.81  The Court found that the evidence presented in the case was “more 
 
73.  Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2071.  “In demanding only ‘deliberate indifference’ to [a 
known risk that a patent exists] the Federal Circuit’s test does not require active efforts by an inducer 
to avoid learning about the infringing nature of the activities.” Id. at 2071. 
74.  See Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2066–72. 
75.  See id. at 2066–70. 
76.  United States v. Schnabel, 939 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1991). 
77.  Id. at 203. 
78.  United States v. Holloway, 731 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1984). 
79.  Id. at 381. 
80.  See Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2069 n.7, 2070 n.9 (citing e.g. United States v. Yasser, 
114 F.2d 558, 560 (3d Cir. 1940)(imputing knowledge where a defendant “closed his eyes” to facts 
that made the existence of a crime obvious); Grant Bros. Constr. Co. v. United States, 114 P. 955, 
959 (1911)(imputing knowledge where defendant “willfully and intentionally ignored facts and 
circumstances known to them”); United States v. Florez, 368 F.3d 1042, 1044 (8th Cir. 2004)(finding 
defendant guilty where defendant was put on notice that a crime was particularly likely and yet 
“intentionally failed to investigate those facts.”). 
81.  Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2071–72. 
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than sufficient” for a jury to find that Pentalpha was willfully blind under the 
Court’s new standard.82  While the Court seemed to indicate throughout the 
case that “active efforts” to avoid learning about a patent were required for a 
finding of willful blindness, the facts the Court relied on to find that Pentalpha 
was willfully blind were largely instances of Pentalpha’s passive behavior, 
rather than active behavior. 
First, the Court found it “telling” that Pentalpha’s CEO did not inform his 
attorney that Pentalpha’s fryer was directly copied from SEB’s overseas 
version.83  The CEO’s failure to tell the attorney this information is an 
omission, not an “active effort.”  Similarly, the Court seemed to indicate that 
Pentalpha’s failure to investigate whether SEB’s fryer was patented in the 
United States was another factor in its finding that Pentalpha was willfully 
blind.84  Again, however, its failure to do so cannot be called an “active 
effort” on the part of Pentalpha to avoid learning about the patent; this was a 
passive omission.  Nonetheless, although the Court articulated its desire to 
require “active efforts to avoid learning about a patent,” the Court seemed to 
find willful blindness based solely on passive omissions on the part of the 
defendant in this case. 
The Court’s contradiction in what behavior satisfies the willful blindness 
standard opens the door for circuit courts, patentees, and innovators to 
interpret the Global-Tech decision in at least two different ways.85  First, the 
decision could be interpreted to require a defendant to take “active efforts” to 
avoid learning of a patent before a finding of willful blindness can be made.  
Second, the decision could be interpreted to allow a finding of willful 
blindness upon a showing that a defendant passively omitted certain 
behaviors, namely, conducting an investigation of existing patents held by 
others.  As will be discussed further in this section, both interpretations have 
pros and cons, and each raises various policy considerations. 
The first interpretation of the willful blindness standard that Global-Tech 
invites is one that requires a defendant to take “active efforts” to avoid 
learning of a patent before a finding of willful blindness can be made.  This 
interpretation, the stricter of the two, has many advantages.  First, an 
interpretation of willful blindness requiring a defendant to take “active 
 
82.  Id. 
83.  Id. at 2071. 
84.  Id. 
85.  This comment only focuses on the different ways that the “deliberate action” requirement 
of the willful blindness test could be interpreted.  For a discussion of possible interpretations of 
willful blindness as knowledge as a broader concept, see David W. Roadcap, Global-Tech 
Appliances Inc. v. SEB S.A. and the Creation of a Flexible Blindness Standard for Induced Patent 
Infringement, 13 N.C. J.L. TECH. ON. 117 (2011). 
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efforts” to avoid learning of a patent promotes the purpose of the Patent Act 
by furthering innovation.  Second, this stricter standard also promotes the 
purpose of section 271(b) itself. 
The strict interpretation promotes the purpose of the Patent Act.  Patent 
protection arises out of Congress’ power, granted by the Constitution, to 
“promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts.”86  The purpose of the 
patent system is not to reward inventors, but to incentivize disclosure to the 
public in order to spark further innovation.87  Adopting a standard for willful 
blindness that requires defendants to make active efforts to avoid learning of a 
patent would further these goals in a number of ways. 
First, adopting the strict standard for willful blindness will promote 
innovation by ensuring that innovators do not need to go to overly 
burdensome lengths to discover all potentially relevant patents.  A less 
stringent standard, one under which a defendant can be held willfully blind 
and thus liable for induced patent infringement by simply failing to discover 
that a competitor’s patent exists, effectively imposes upon defendants a duty 
to investigate others’ patents.  However, in the context of direct infringement, 
the Federal Circuit has directly rejected such an affirmative duty.88  Because 
such a duty to investigate has been rejected in the context of direct 
infringement, it would not be logical to impose such a duty in the context of 
secondary infringement. 
Requiring affirmative, deliberate actions to avoid learning of a 
competitor’s patent before a finding of willful blindness can be made, as 
opposed to finding defendants willfully blind because of an omission (failing 
to discover a relevant patent) would ensure that a chilling effect on innovation 
is not produced.  According to some commentators, the cost of conducting a 
patent clearance search is very high, and in some industries can cost up to 
$5,000 per patent.89  Further, according to a survey conducted by the 
American Intellectual Property Law Association in 2007, a subsequent 
validity analysis can cost up to $13,000 more per patent.90  Given the very 
high cost of these searches, many companies, particularly small businesses 
with limited resources, might decide that the costs of innovation outweigh the 
benefits.  This reluctance could create a chilling effect on innovation, which 
 
86.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
87.  Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989). 
88.  In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (overruling Underwater 
Devices, Inc., v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). 
89.  JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MUERER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK, 213 (2008). 
90.  American Intellectual Property Law Association, Report of the Economic Survey 2007, at 
I-83. 
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would be completely counter to the goal of the Patent Act.  Even if companies 
do choose to expend the financial resources to conduct a patent search, the 
fear of potential litigation due to an incomplete or inadequate search might 
lead them to avoid introducing new products. 
In addition to promoting the Patent Act’s purpose of furthering 
innovation, the strict standard promotes the purpose of section 271(b) itself.  
The legislative history of section 271(b) indicates that Congress’ purpose in 
enacting that section is to create liability for “morally culpable” conduct.91  
Adopting a standard that would hold innovators to be willfully blind upon a 
failure to discover all relevant patents is inconsistent with Congress’ intent. 
There are many situations in which an innovator might fail to discover 
every patent relevant to a new product, but nevertheless have acted in a way 
that was not “morally culpable.”  For instance, an inventor who conducts his 
own patent search but does not find any patents covering his technology, or 
one who commissions a freedom-to-operate opinion from an attorney and 
subsequently obtains permission to operate despite there being a protective 
patent could be held liable, even though he acted in good faith to investigate 
competitors’ patents.  These defendants are not morally culpable, and their 
behavior is not the type of behavior Congress sought to punish by enacting 
section 271(b) of the patent act. 
On the other hand, allowing a finding of willful blindness only when a 
defendant takes affirmative, deliberate steps to avoid learning of a 
competitor’s patent (such as the defendant in Global-Tech, who purposefully 
went abroad to purchase a product without U.S. patent markings), incentivizes 
idleness on the part of inventors.  If an inventor cannot be willfully blind 
unless he actively does something, the logical course for one seeking to avoid 
liability would be to do nothing at all, which promotes disrespect for existing 
patent rights and leaves patent holders without much meaningful recourse in 
the event that an infringement would occur.  The Supreme Court, when 
deciding Global-Tech, clearly indicated its desire to avoid “protecting parties 
who actively encourage others to violate patent rights and who take deliberate 
steps to remain ignorant of those rights.”92  Further, the Court recognized that 
defendants who deliberately shield themselves from certain information are 
“just as culpable as those who have actual knowledge.”93 
If defendants cannot be found liable for induced infringement unless they 
make deliberate, affirmative actions, more and more inventors will not only 
get away with causing the infringement of others’ products, but also with 
 
91.  S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 28 (1952). 
92.  Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2069 n.8. 
93.  Id. at 2069. 
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profiting from the infringement that they caused, leaving patent holders with 
little recourse except to sue those who are infringing, who are likely to be 
customers without a “deep pocket.” 
CONCLUSION: A “GOOD FAITH” APPROACH SHOULD BE TAKEN 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Global-Tech, while it settles once and 
for all a longstanding issue regarding the level of intent required for induced 
infringement, is not completely clear.  Its willful blindness standard seems 
clear on its face: to be willfully blind a defendant must (1) subjectively 
believe in a high probability that a patent exists, and (2) take deliberate 
actions do avoid learning of that fact.  However, the reasoning and outcome in 
Global-Tech leave some debate over how the second prong of the test may be 
satisfied, as noted above.  In order to balance the rights of patent holders and 
new inventors, an approach that punishes only defendants who act in bad faith 
should be taken. 
As pointed out above, it is unclear whether an omission—failing to 
discover the existence of a competitor’s patent—can count as an “active 
effort” that satisfies the second prong of the Supreme Court’s willful 
blindness test.  An omission should constitute an active effort, if it is an 
omission that is made in bad faith.  For example, if an inventor creates a 
product and performs patent searches diligently, or seeks a freedom-to-
operate opinion from an attorney to whom he has presented all relevant 
information, but subsequently fails to discover the existence of a patent that 
he later induces the infringement of, he should not be held liable, as his failure 
to discover the patent was not in bad faith.  This approach would ensure that 
inventors are respecting existing rights, while still allowing inventors to 
innovate and enter the market without fear that they might be held liable for 
inducement through a faulty patent search. 
KRISTIN M. HAGEN* 
 
 
 * Many thanks go to the Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review staff members and 
editors for their assistance with editing and providing feedback and suggestions, and to Professor 
Irene Calboli for her mentorship and support. 
